Evaluating the Safety of Launch and Reentry Operations in the National Airspace System

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It is Getting Busier in the Airspace...



Source: https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/industry/media/Map_US_spaceports.pdf



SOF

Launch and Reentry Operations Affect Other NAS Users







Contingent Aircraft Hazard Areas (AHAs)

- Contingent (dynamic) AHAs is a method to efficiently integrate more frequent launch and reentry operations
 - How safe are they?



COE

Air Traffic Control Timeline for Off-Nominal Case



(Time to clear <= Time until debris reaches NAS)



Evacuation Due to a Winged Re-entry from Orbit





COE





Develop a fast-time analysis capability to provide operational measures of safety for launch and reentry operations



Prior versions of model used by FAA and DoD to assess algorithms and performance standards of different systems



Collaboration



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Stanford University

Debris modeling



FAA Center of Excellence for Commercial Space Transportation

Research/Industry Member

Trajectory modeling



Office of Comercial Space Transportation

Scenario development and trajectories



NASA



Research Question



Past MITRE research has shown that times to clear hazard areas are mostly dependent upon:

- Size of the hazard volume
- Orientation of the flow of traffic to the hazard volume
- Density of traffic in and around the hazard volume
- ATC notification delay
- How sensitive is the time to clear to these factors?
- Utilize MITRE's capability to evaluate these factors







Off nominal reentry over the continental US



Examine: Traffic orientation, traffic density, ATC Notification Delay, and aircraft surveillance







Examined sensitivity of metrics to the examined factors

- <u>"time to clear a hazard area</u>" time it takes for all aircraft to exit a hazard area after an off nominal event
- "time in hazard" time each flight spends in the hazard area



Findings: ATC Notification Delay



Large sensitivity to ATC notification delay

- Time it takes for ATC to be aware of an off-nominal
- Not a linear relationship





Findings: Traffic Orientation

- Sensitive to traffic orientation
- Longer times generally coincide with the hazard area orientation (~310/130 degrees)



Original AHA with aircraft on eastbound headings. (source MITRE)



ADS-B and 3-minute ATC notification delay





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Analysis Results Summary



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- "Time to clear a hazard area" is most sensitive to ATC notification delay, traffic orientation, and traffic density
- "Time in hazard" is less sensitive to the factors than "time to clear a hazard area"





MITRE's capability can assess if contingent (dynamic) AHAs are safe to use

- Can determine if aircraft can clear AHA before debris reaches the NAS
- Detailed, parametric assessments of variety of vehicles and trajectories, ATC strategies, separation concepts and standards, and surveillance performance needs
- FAA can utilize this sensitivity study to focus resources on factors that could most improve safety for these operations





Questions?







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